Using a complete set of the SEC filing information on hedge funds (Form ADV) and the TASS data, we develop a quantitative model called the ω-Score to measure hedge fund operational risk. The ω-Score is related to conflict of interest issues, concentrated ownership, and reduced leverage in the ADV data. With a statistical methodology, we further relate the ω-Score to readily available information such as fund performance, volatility, size, age, and fee structures. Finally, we demonstrate that while operational risk is more significant than financial risk in explaining fund failure, there is a significant and positive interaction between operational risk and financial risk. This is consistent with rogue trading anecdotes that suggest that fund failure associated with excessive risk taking occurs when operational controls and oversight are weak.
developed a comprehensive questionnaire for hedge fund due diligence with detailed questions ranging from management, strategy, risk, to service providers. 5 Due diligence performed by investing institutions is often conducted to the extent of a background check, an on-site office visit, manager interviews, automated legal alert systems on fund personnel activities, in addition to review of publicly available information. Although due diligence is intensively conducted in the hedge fund industry, the current practice is mostly focused at the qualitative level instead of the quantitative level. This is because assessing operational risk necessarily relies upon intangible variables such as historical manager behavior and human factors relating to unethical or illegal acts. However, as the number of funds increases, and the fixed cost of evaluating them remains constant, there is a need for numerical scoring models in the spirit of Altman's z-Score model (1968) for bankruptcy. While a quantitative model can never fully replace human judgement, the processing of "soft information" can help prioritize the due diligence process. Indeed, with the increasing flow of available information about managers, a reliable model is essential to reduce the dimensionality of the due-diligence process in order to better assess the operational risk exposure.
In this paper, starting from hedge fund filings with the SEC (Form ADV), we investigate the potential for a quantitative approach to the operational risk issue. Form ADV is potentially relevant to operational risk, as one of the purposes of hedge fund disclosure, according to the SEC is "keeping unfit persons from using hedge funds to perpetrate fraud." 6 Thus, the SEC devised a set of questions intended to uncover past violations by the investment adviser, and to elucidate condition that might leave clients vulnerable to future fraud or operational failure. Per the SEC requirement, major hedge funds based in the U.S. with more than 14 clients, assets of at least $25 million and a lockup period less than two years, as well as any internationally based fund with at least In our analysis of these filings, we find that operational risk, as measured by past legal or regulatory problems incurred by investment advisers or fund managers, is strongly related to ADV variables such as conflict of interest, ownership, and leverage.
Hence, it is possible to develop an instrument for assessment of operational risk based on the ADV data. which is a function of fund performance, volatility, fund age and size, and fee structure.
This paper is related to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2007) . In that work we used the ω-Score to explore the question of whether Form ADV information was redundant in the investment marketplace. In this paper we turn to the crucial question of whether the ω-Score can be used to predict future fund failure. The main contribution of this paper is a scoring model for detecting operational risk in the hedge fund industry.
We also examine the interaction between operational risk and financial risk, especially the marginal contribution of operational risk in predicting fund failure after controlling for financial risk. While we anticipate that more sophisticated models can be developed in the future, this paper demonstrates the feasibility of scoring funds according to their potential for operational risk events.
Data
We use data from two different sources. Thus, the data downloaded in the future will not match exactly the data used in this study. 10 A few of the funds also listed an investment adviser with a different name than the management company. We also included these companies in our search if the management company was not located.
In a majority of cases, the company was identified using just the management company investors (73%).
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Empirical Results
Defining "Problem Funds" and "Non-Problem Funds". In order to assess operational risk, we need to define the term. We start by classifying funds as "problem"
funds and "non-problem" funds in the ADV data.
Problem funds are those whose management companies answered in the affirmative to any of the questions on Item 11 in Form ADV while non-problem funds answered no to all questions on Item 11. Problems covered on Item 11 include any past felony or financial related misdemeanor changes or convictions. The form also includes questions concerning any SEC, CFTC, federal or state agency or other regulatory disciplinary action as well as civil lawsuits 14 . Of the 2,299 funds in our sample, 368 (or 11 We did not explicitly keep track of this breakdown, but estimate that fewer than 15% of all matches were made using the fund name. 12 Some of the ADV filings did not list any funds. In these cases, the name and address of the ADV was used to verify a match. 13 As of the beginning of April 2006, we were unable to match around 100 management companies in TASS with U.S. addresses and over $25 million in assets. There are a variety of reasons for these companies not to be registered, including a lockup period change, a reduction in assets or an error in the TASS database. 14 Given that an affirmative answer on Item 11 could reflect anything from involvement in a civil suit to conviction of a felony, it is useful to examine whether the category of problem makes a difference. These classifications are non-exclusionary; one manager may show up in all four categories. One would expect that managers convicted of a felony would be treated differently in the market than those with less serious regulatory infractions. Many managers are involved in civil suits that are unrelated to operational concerns. Empirical analysis (not reported here) finds that felonies are treated with slightly greater severity than other 16%) have management firms that answered yes to at least one question on Item 11.
15
The percentage of funds with problems is not being driven by only a few management companies; of the 879 management companies, 126 companies, or 14.3%, answered yes to a question on Item 11. This table reports cross-sectional means, medians and the difference in means of descriptive statistics for both "Problem" and "Non-Problem" funds in our population of hedge funds filing Form ADV. "Problem" funds are any TASS fund whose management company answered "Yes" to any of the questions on Item 11 of Form ADV. "Non-Problem" funds are all other TASS funds that filed Form ADV. Avg Return, Std Dev, 1 st Order Auto Corr, Sharpe Ratio are the average return of the fund, the standard deviation, the first order autocorrelation, Sharpe Ratio of the fund over its life. Table 1 examines the performance differences and fund characteristics between problem and non-problem funds. There is no significant difference in terms of standard deviation or autocorrelation of returns. Problem funds are older than non-problem funds, indicating that it is more likely for a fund to encounter a problem over a longer time horizon. The mean return, Sharpe Ratio, incentive fee level, and the percentage using a high water mark are all significantly lower for problem funds, perhaps indicating problem funds may be of lower quality.
issues. However, the same analysis reveals that any issue that requires an Item 11 response appears to be regarded as raising concerns on operational issues. 15 These results were also run excluding fund-of-funds as their structure is different than hedge funds. There are no material differences between those results and the reported results.
Defining Operational Risk. Legal and regulatory compliance issues provide a simple -and measurable -proxy for operational risk more broadly defined to include personnel problems, investment process, internal control, portfolio pricing, or compliance issues. On this basis we define legal and regulatory "problem funds" as those that have high operational risk while "non-problem funds" are those that have low operational risk.
This definition is of course necessarily incomplete. Some of the legal and regulatory problems identified in the ADV forms may not be related to operational issues.
Furthermore, there may be funds with operational issues that have not yet attracted the attention of legal or regulatory authorities. Nevertheless, our analysis later in the paper shows that this definition is directly related to the current conflict of interest settings, ownership, and leverage ratios.
Operational Risk and the ADV Variables. 19 This may be due to a higher incidence of fraudulent activity by managers of problem funds, or alternatively, it may be due to the fact that the simple presence of apparent conflicts of interest attracts more regulatory scrutiny and litigation. Again, all the differences are significant at the 1% level.
Panel C examines the ownership and capital structure differences between the two groups. Problem funds have a higher number of direct and controlling owners.
20
Interestingly, the number of direct owners in the form of non-individual domestic entities (DirectDomestic) is higher for problem funds than it is for non-problem funds. This implies that problem firms are more likely to be structured as a venture or partnership with another institution. It also has the effect of allowing owners to hide their names from the ownership list, although it does not exempt them from reporting. Finally, the 75% ownership variable, which is the percentage of owners who own 75% of the company, is larger for problem funds. Theoretical results suggest that fear of expropriation-one source of operational risk-will make the management more concentrated rather than less concentrated. These results are confirmed in our data and all the differences are highly significant.
18 It is also striking that 69.3 percent of non problem funds also allow their personnel to trade fund securities on their own account. While significantly lower than the problem funds, it suggests that some of the "non problem" funds are "problem funds" in waiting. 19 It is important to note that many jurisdictions prevent public funds engaging in soft dollar transactions because of this appearance of conflict. 20 The definition of a controlling owner is set by the SEC. This is not a flag set by the company itself.
An important insight revealed in Panel C is the fact that problem funds are less able to raise leverage than non-problem funds. This issue is examined in depth in Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2007) who argue that operational risk issues make prime brokers and lenders less willing to provide leverage and when they do, they evidently provide less leverage. While financial risk is often associated with a high degree of leverage, it seems that the inability to raise leverage capital is itself a signal of serious operational issues uncovered in the due diligence conducted by potential lenders. Table 3 reports the results of the canonical correlation analysis. Average monthly returns from the previous year, monthly standard deviation from the previous year, size at the beginning of the period, fund age and whether or not the fund reports assets are included in the analysis, as they have been previously related to fund death (Liang, 2000; Brown, Goetzmann & Park, 2001 Backtest: From 1994 to 2005, we compute the ω-Score each year using the raw coefficients from our original analysis on the matched sample. 23 We then regress fund returns on this operational risk ω-Score and include unreported style dummies to control for style differences. 24 We also control for market risk by estimating market betas for all funds each year and include the unreported betas in the yearly cross-sectional regressions.
We use Brown and Goetzmann (2003) cluster-based style dummies. We begin in 1994 as TASS began keeping defunct funds in their dataset that year. Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. 23 Instead of assuming the TASS characteristic data are static over time, we utilize nine different TASS datasets over a period of nine years (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) to use the most accurate characteristic data related to each fund at each time period. We use returns from the most recent TASS dataset however, as they are the most complete and accurate. To control for backfill bias, we remove the first 18 months of returns for each fund. Since we don't have the fund characteristic data from 1994-1997, we used 1998 for calculating the scores for these years. In this analysis we take as given the coefficient values determined on the basis of the relationship between TASS and ADV data given in Table 3 . According to Congressional testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in March 13, 2007 a large majority of funds continue to register and file Form ADV. As this information becomes available, it should be possible to update the relationship and determine more precise measures of the ω-Score.
24 Alternative specifications of the canonical analysis were performed, including adjusted returns. These alternative specifications did not change the relationship between operational risk and returns. Over the entire twelve-year history, we observe a negative ω-Score coefficient.
The ω-Score is significant at the 5% level. Hence, operational risk is negatively related to fund returns. Of the twelve years, the operational risk variable is negatively related to returns in ten of the years. Note that 1998 was an extremely difficult year for hedge funds due to the Russian debt crisis and the near collapse of the LTCM. 25 1998 is also a year of great attrition of hedge funds, which would eliminate ex-post some of the riskiest funds in the sample-a selection bias that is known to induce a spurious ex-post cross-sectional relationship between risk and return (see Hsieh (2000, 2002) , and Liang (2000)). 
Using the ω-Score
where z T denotes the transpose of the vector z and 0 ( ) t λ is the base-line hazard rate. The vector β is a set of the regression coefficients and assumed to be the same for all funds.
To estimate Cox (1972 Cox ( , 1975 introduced the partial likelihood function, which eliminates the unknown baseline hazard 0 ( ) t λ and accounts for censored survival times.
26 Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) use the Cox model to analyze hedge fund failure. They find that performance, risk and fund age play important roles in the fund termination. They use standard deviation as the risk measure. The higher the standard deviation, the higher the hazard rate of a fund.
In our paper, we are interested in the prognosis of the survival of the fund (as measured by the time to liquidation 27 ) based on the fund's ω-Score and a measure of 26 See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for details. 27 Funds can leave the TASS database for many reasons. Funds closed to new investment may see no particular reason to report results into TASS, and many funds report in only on a quarterly basis leading to the appearance of fund failure in the last three months of the database. We define fund failure as funds which no longer report to TASS giving as their reason "Fund liquidated". The results reported in Table 5 Hazard model are given in Table 5 . In this table, the coefficients give the increased risk of failure for a given unit increase in the ω-Score, financial risk (measured by ln(σ) using data up to the date the ω-Score is computed), and the interaction between operational risk (ω-Score) and financial risk (ln(σ)) 28 . Much of the discussion of major rogue trader risk events from Barings to Société Générale observe that significant financial risk was undertaken in an environment of poor operational controls 29 . We would therefore expect to find that high financial risk is associated with significant operational risk. If our measure of operational risk were merely proxying for financial risk we would expect operational risk to be wiped out in these regressions. The opposite is true. While operational risk is more significant than financial risk, there is a significant positive interaction which suggests that funds with funds failing up to the end of March 2008 did not substantively change any of the results reported in Table  5 . 28 Since the hedge fund industry is relatively new there are many new funds that have not failed (yet). This is a well-known issue in duration analysis and is referred to in the literature as the "right censoring problem". A Heckman-like correction is standard to deal with this problem and was used in the results reported in Table 5 . 29 A particularly well-documented case of management failures associated with excess financial risk is given by the rogue trading losses at National Australia Bank (APRA 2004 , PwC 2004 .
high degrees of operational risk are more subject to failure from financial risk, which is consistent with rogue trading anecdotes that suggest that fund failure associated with excessive risk taking occur when operational controls and oversight are weak.
The importance of operational risk is reasonably similar across style categories.
The ω-Score is significant for styles like convertible arbitrage, dedicated short bias, emerging markets, equity market neutral, fund of funds, and long/short equity, implying that operational risk is important to explain fund failures in these categories. However, the coefficients are insignificant for styles such as event driven, fixed income arbitrage, global macro, and managed futures. For these styles, financial risk or other types of risk may be important co-factors of failure in these funds. For styles like convertible arbitrage, emerging market, event driven, fund of funds, and managed futures, higher operational risk is also related to higher financial risk. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we build an operational risk measure, the ω-Score, for hedge funds.
This ω-Score is related to the SEC filing information (Form ADV) such as the conflict of interest issues, leverage, and ownership. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, lower leverage corresponds to higher operational risk, suggesting that the capital marketplace may perceive these managers as operationally risky and rationally reduce their access to debt. Further, we correlate the ADV variables with the readily available TASS variables in order to build an observable proxy for operational risk. The final ω-Score based on the TASS data is able to effectively predict the future disappearance of funds from the sample. The higher the ω-Score, the shorter is the projected fund life.. Operational risk is of course not the only factor explaining fund failure. We find that there is a significant positive interaction with financial risk which suggests that funds with high degrees of operational risk are more subject to failure from excessive financial risk. This is consistent with rogue trading anecdotes that suggest that fund failure associated with excessive risk taking occur when operational controls and oversight are weak.
Our results are based on a snapshot at a point of time when most U.S. domiciled hedge funds were required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission as investment advisors and file Form ADV. Our analysis shows that information contained on this form does indeed provide information relevant to a determination of operational risk. According to Congressional testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in March 13, 2007 a large majority of funds find it in their interest to register and file Form ADV even though there is no legal requirement for them to do so. Our analysis seems to show that there is an argument to be made in favor of more disclosure rather than less disclosure.
